This paper deals with bimatrix games in uncertainty environment based on several types of ordering, which Maeda proposed. But Maeda's models was just made based on symmetrical triangle fuzzy variable. In this paper, we generalized Maeda's model to the non-symmetrical environment. In other words, we investigated the fuzzy bimatrix games based on nonsymmetrical L-R fuzzy variables. Then the pseudoinverse of a nonconstant monotone function was given and the concept of crisp parametric bimatrix games was introduced. At last, the existence condition of Nash equilibrium strategies of the fuzzy bimatrix games is proposed and weak Pareto equilibrium of the fuzzy bimatrix games was obtained through the Nash equilibrium of the crisp parametric bimatrix.
Introduction
Nash presented noncooperative game theory 1, 2 based on the assumption that each player has a well-defined quantitative utility function over a set of the player's strategy, each player attempts to optimize his own expected payoffs, and each is assumed to know the extensive game completely. In this paper, above assumption had been violated involving complex problems in economics, engineering, social and political sciences due to the difficulty inherent in defining an adequate payoff function for each player in these types of problems. In other words, while modeling the noncooperative games, each player can not give the exact payoffs in practice because of the complexity and uncertainty of the problems. So the gain or payoff function is not always evaluated by a crisp number. It should be formulated semantically, in such terms as excellent, good, sufficiently reliable, durable, or resistant. Fortunately, in this paper, we have another utility to measure the uncertainty: the fuzzy set theory. Indeed, a fuzzy variable is used to present the payoffs of the players. For example, one player's payoff is about 100 thousand dollars. Since the expected payoffs of the player are fuzzy variable, we should define new concepts of equilibrium strategy to investigate their properties.
Butnariu 3 started with the work of noncooperative fuzzy games, he proposed a game to be fuzzy when the players have fuzzy preferences. Campos 4 modeled the twoperson zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs by fuzzy programming and transformed the fuzzy programming into a linear programming problems through Yager's fuzzy variable ordering method 5 . Nishizaki and Sakawa 6, 7 investigated single-and multiobjective games and presented max-min algorithm with respect to a degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal. Through maximizing the minimum of the fuzzy expected payoff and fuzzy goal, they transform their model into a fractional programming problem and compute the fractional programming by a relaxed method., Bector et al. 8, 9 and Vijay e al. 10, 11 modeled the noncooperative games in uncertainty by fuzzy programming problem and computed their model by the fuzzy dual programming. Takashi 12, 13 presented three kinds of equilibrium strategies of fuzzy matrix games based on especial symmetric triangular fuzzy variable and investigated the existence condition of these equilibrium strategies. But it is partial acceptance to modeling payoffs by symmetric triangular fuzzy variable.
This paper was going to generalize Maeda's model and investigate all types of equilibrium strategies based on more general asymmetric L-R fuzzy variables. Then we introduce the crisp parametric matrix games and its equilibrium strategies in order to find the Pareto equilibrium strategies of fuzzy bimatrix games. For that purpose, this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic definitions and notations about fuzzy set theory. Then, several fuzzy ordering that Ramík 14 and Maeda presented were introduced. And the pseudoinverse of a nonconstant monotone function was given. In Section 3, we focus on the condition of different equilibrium strategies. Especially, the relation between the Nash equilibrium strategies of crisp bimatrix parametric games and Pareto equilibrium strategies of fuzzy bimatrix games is established.
Preliminaries
Definition 2.1. A L-R fuzzy variable a is a fuzzy set defined on the space of real number, whose membership functions μ a : R → 0, 1 as following
where, L, R : R → 0, 1 are not constant and left continuous function, they satisfy the followings:
0; 3 they are nonincreasing on 0, ∞ . The L-R fuzzy variable is denoted by a a, l, r L-R , a, l and r are called the center, left extension, and right extension, respectively.
Remark 2.2.
Notice that the domains of L t and R t , which are defined in Definition 2.1, are 0, ∞ , respectively. Moreover, for t ∈ 1, ∞ , L t R t 0 holds. We denote the L-R fuzzy variable set as F, for a ∈ F, α ∈ 0, 1 , a α {x | μ a x ≥ α, x ∈ R} is called as α-level set of a. a 0 {x | μ a x > 0, x ∈ R} is called support of a. In the following of the paper, we denote a 
2.2
Example 2.4. Let R t be a function defined as Definition 2.1, the graph of R t is given in Figure 1 . The graph of the pseudoinverse R −1 t is given in Figure 2 . These pictures also indicate how to construct the pseudoinverse of a non-constant monotone function. 
2.4
Based on the extension principle, we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 2.7. Let a, b ∈ F be L-R fuzzy variables, c ∈ R, then, the membership function of the sum of two fuzzy variables a and b, the scalar product of a and c are defined as following:
ii μ c a x max{sup x cμ μ a , 0}, with sup{φ} − ∝. 
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Proof. Just prove i , the proof of ii is similar to i . Let
be the membership function of fuzzy variables a and b see Figure 3 , respectively. From Definition 2.1, for α ∈ 0, 1 , it holds that
b. Combining these with Definition 2.10, it implies that
Combining 2.7 and 2.8 , we have
2.9
Conversely, for any α ∈ 0, 1 , it holds 2.6 . Using the pseudoinverse of L and R, we obtain
From i of this Theorem and Remark 2. 
2.12
In short, one denotes {f
Equilibrium Strategies of Bimatrix Games with Fuzzy Payoffs
When we apply the game theory to model some practical problems which we encounter in real world, we have to find the values of payoffs exactly. However, it is difficult to know the exact values of payoffs and we just know the values of payoffs approximately. In such situations, we should model the payoffs of the player as a fuzzy variable, so the expected payoffs of the game should be fuzzy valued. Since there are no concepts of equilibrium strategies to be accepted widely, it is an important task to define the concepts of equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties in fuzzy viroment. In this paper, the payoffs of strategy pair i, j ∈ S I × S J will be modeled as L-R fuzzy variable, such as
. . , m} and N {1, 2, . . . , n} be sets of all pure strategies of Player I and Player J, respectively. Their mixed strategies are probability distribution on their pure strategies. The set of mixed strategies for Player I is represented by
where R m is a set of m-dimensional real numbers space. Similarly, the set of mixed strategies for Player J is represented by 
is payoff matrix of Player I and Player J, respectively.
In the following of this paper, ii there exists no y ∈ S J such that x * T By * ≺ x * T By.
It is obvious that, if the payoffs of fuzzy bimatrix games are all crisp number, then the above three definitions coincide with the equilibrium of a crisp bimatrix games. Therefore, these definitions are natural generalization of the crisp bimatrix games. 
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Proof. It is easy to obtain i from Lemma 2.8. Hence we just prove ii . Since x T Ay is a liner function with respect to a ij , hence it is continuous and increased with respect to a ij , from Lemma 2.12, it is obvious that 
The theorem is proved. Remark 3.9. From above existence conditions of equilibrium strategy, it is obvious that the equilibrium strategy of fuzzy bimatrix games still is equilibrium strategy of three crisp bimatrix games. It is difficult to satisfy these conditions at the same time, but in following cases, there exists a equilibrium strategy of the bimatrix games with fuzzy payoffs.
Case 1.
The payoff matrix of the bimatrix games are as follows:
where Proof. We just present the proof of the closed convex set of T I Γ , the proof of the closed convex set of T J Γ is similar to the proof of T I Γ . Let us assume x * ∈ T I Γ and y * ∈ T J Γ , then the pair x * , y * is a equilibrium strategy of the fuzzy bimatrix games. From Definition 3.3, it is obvious that
By Theorem 3.7 and Remark 3.9, the pair x * , y * is also the equilibrium strategy of three crisp bimatrix games 
ii there exists no y ∈ S J such that
Proof. Let
be the membership function of a ij , which is the payoff of Player I based on pure strategy pair i, j . If the pair x * , y * ∈ S I × S J is the Pareto equilibrium of the game Γ. we assume there exists a strategy x ∈ S I such that 3.25 holds, that is to say,
It implies the following from above:
Furthermore, the above two inequalities do not occur simultaneously. Let α ∈ 0, 1 , then L −1 α ∈ 0, 1 and R −1 α ∈ 0, 1 based on Remark 2.5. From above inequalities, it indicates that
3.30
By rearranging, it implies Let α incline to 1 and set α 0, respectively, it holds
This is a contradiction. By the similar way, we have there exists no y ∈ S J such that x * T By x * T By * . 
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to the Theorem 3.12.
In the following of this paper, we will characterize the crisp parametric matrix games. Then other types of equilibrium strategy of fuzzy bimatrix games will be investigated through the crisp parametric matrix games.
Let Γ ≡ {I, J}, S I , S J , A, B be a fuzzy bimatrix game, while Player I chooses pure strategy i and Player J chooses pure strategy j, we set 1 − λ a ij − l ij λ a ij r ij to be the payoffs of player I and − 1 − μ b ij − h ij μ b ij z ij to be the payoffs of player J, where λ, μ ∈ 0, 1 . The payoff matrixes of player I and J are 
3.37
For y ∈ S J , from Definition 3.14 ii , it holds 
